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INTRODUCTION
Through significant public and private investment, autonomous
vehicle (AV) technology continues to develop rapidly. Industry development
has bifurcated into two sectors.1 One industry sector has focused on
introducing limited autonomous features such as lane and speed assist
capabilities. Tesla’s Autopilot technology is a widely known example of this
type of AV system. The other group has focused on introducing almost fully
autonomous vehicles within very limited constraints, such as shuttles on
college campuses or in designated pilot program areas. Pilot programs of
these fully autonomous vehicles are considered to be state of the art for AVs,

1

Automated Vehicles for Safety, NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., https://www.
nhtsa.gov/technology-innovation/automated-vehicles-safety#topic-benefits [https://perma.
cc/WY6N-B2SJ] (last visited Dec. 4, 2021) (describing the progress made on fully
automated and partially automated vehicles) [hereinafter NHTSA AV SAFETY WEBPAGE].

196

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

and pose drastically different safety questions because they travel for long
periods with no additional inputs from human operators.2
The National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) has
highlighted four areas of potential benefit from autonomous vehicles:
increased safety though reduction of driver error; economic benefits from
American leadership in new technology; efficiency and convenience that will
allow all industries to be more productive; and freedom of mobility for people
who are unable to drive.3 The United States (U.S.) government and nearly all
autonomous vehicle manufacturers identify public safety as their primary
consideration in the development of this new technology. NHTSA’s Fatality
Analysis Reporting System reported that 36,096 people died from motor
vehicle crashes in the United States in 2019.4 By decreasing the possibility of
human error, impairment, and distraction while driving, autonomous vehicles
have enormous potential to save lives and reduce the economic burden
associated with crashes.5
Although the development and adoption of autonomous vehicle
technology represents an opportunity to improve public safety, that benefit
will only materialize if autonomous vehicles are themselves safe.6 In the
United States, an overlapping system of state and federal regulation,
consumer information channels, international standards, and tort liability
provides assurance of safety for automobiles.
Innovation in this space could be greatly enhanced by a “regulatory
sandbox” governance model for ensuring the safety of new technologies. The
regulatory sandbox model, originally applied to financial technologies
(FinTech) products, involves providing newly developing technologies with
a limited space in which they are free to innovate. This usually involves
exemptions from existing regulations that would prevent real-world testing
of the new technology, but with strict limitations in scope and duration,
requirements to continuously disclose data, and procedures for updating
exemption scope in response to positive or negative evidence from existing
trials.
Many aspects of current U.S. policy for allowing limited testing of
autonomous vehicles constitute a regulatory sandbox, but conscious
2

FORD MOTOR CO., A MATTER OF TRUST, FORD’S APPROACH TO DEVELOPING SELFDRIVING VEHICLES 11 (2018) (illustrating Ford’s pilot programs for their fully autonomous
vehicles).
3
NHTSA AV SAFETY WEBPAGE, supra note 1.
4
Id.
5
See NAT’L SCI. & TECH. COUNCIL & U.S. DEP’T TRANSP., ENSURING AMERICAN
LEADERSHIP IN AUTOMATED VEHICLE TECHNOLOGIES: AUTOMATED VEHICLES 4.0 2 (2020)
[hereinafter Automated Vehicles 4.0] (“By eliminating the possibility of human error or poor
human choices (e.g., impairment or distraction) while driving, [AVs] ha[ve] enormous
potential to save lives and reduce the economic burden associated with crashes.”).
6
Id. at 4.
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adherence to a sandbox-style model could improve public safety and hasten
innovation. For instance, NHTSA has granted limited waivers from Federal
Motor Vehicle Safety Standards granted to the autonomous delivery service
company, Nuro, and California has granted on-road state testing permits to
more than fifty AV development companies.7 These waivers and permits all
contain limited requirements for data reporting and collaboration with
regulators.8 However, the data collected in these environments is not
sufficient for the regulators to form safety assurance protocols in the future.
Safety assurance testing performed by regulators for autonomous vehicles
will likely involve a combination of simulation, closed circuit testing, and onroad testing. While data reported by Nuro to NHTSA is more comprehensive,
autonomous vehicle testing companies in California only submit basic
information about the frequency of “disengagements,” which are instances in
which a human operator must retake control of a vehicle.9 This low level of
data reporting is not sufficient to evaluate the safety of autonomous vehicles,
and it will not support a regulatory agency’s work to establish safety
standards in the future.10
Part II of this paper describes the concept of safety assurance,
describes challenges for assurance measurements in autonomous vehicles,
and presents common methods of safety assurance applied in other regulatory
environments. Part III describes the key features of regulatory sandboxes and
considers how they might apply to autonomous vehicle safety assurance
challenges. Part IV describes the complex and overlapping regulatory
approach for evaluating safety assurance in traditional automobiles and how
that approach applies to autonomous vehicle testing. Part V concludes with
the recommendation that policy makers implement a regulatory sandbox
model as a way to not only ensure public safety while leaving space for
innovation but also as a way to build regulatory expertise that will enable
appropriate formal rulemaking governing autonomous vehicles by the time
that AVs are ready for introduction into consumer markets.

7

Press Release, Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., NHTSA Grants Nuro Exemption
Petition for Low-Speed Driverless Vehicle (Feb 6, 2020), https://www.nhtsa.gov/pressreleases/nhtsa-grants-nuro-exemption-petition-low-speed-driverless-vehicle
[perma.cc/JS67-7TE3].
8
Id.
9
Andrew J. Hawkins, Everyone Hates California's Self-Driving Car Reports, VERGE (Feb.
26, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/2020/2/26/21142685/california-dmv-self-driving-cardisengagement-report-data [perma.cc/SRA9-WUEC].
10
Id.
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I. ASSURANCE
A. Functional Safety and Assurance Through Policy
1. Functional safety
Functional safety is a common term in engineering disciplines. It
means the absence of unreasonable risk due to hazards caused by
malfunctioning behavior or faulty design characteristics.11 What is not
included is risks that were intentionally not designed for and not caused by
malfunction. In the development of autonomous vehicles, not all road risks
can be eliminated at once. Developers of autonomous vehicles choose the
risks that they want to mitigate, and engineer solutions to avoid those risks.
As long as the choice of risks to avoid is valid by some definition and the
product works as intended, the vehicle will meet its functional safety goal.
Functional safety evaluations in industry typically involve taxonomic
breakdowns of system components and assignments of probabilities and
possible outcomes of failure modes of each one.12 For autonomous vehicles,
functional safety taxonomies are the subject of a widely accepted
international standard. The purpose of the standard is to assist developers to
assess risk of system and component failures and mitigate their effects
systematically, qualitatively. These taxonomies are thorough and complex.
Functional safety standards often encourage consideration of possible risks
at the conceptualization, product planning, and actual production stages.13
The standards build in considerations such as cost, liability, and engineering
feasibility to the evaluation of safety risks.14
2. Assurance
Assurance is a process that proves a product or technology is as
functionally safe. Assurance is achieved when safe outcomes are likely to
occur with a high level of confidence. Safety assurance can include a large

11
See DNV GROUP, ISO 26262: FUNCTIONAL SAFETY FOR AUTOMOTIVE,
https://www.dnv.com/services/functional-safety-for-automotive-iso-26262--82719 [https://
perma.cc/3LT3-CABW] (defining what is required to avoid unreasonable risks).
12
See ISO 26262: ROAD VEHICLES — FUNCTIONAL SAFETY 5–6, 10 (2d ed. 2018),
https://www.iso.org/standard/68383.html [https://perma.cc/DA2V-QMUA](last visited Mar
18, 2021) (defining functional safety terms).
13
Id. at vi, 23, 26.
14
Id. at vi, 1.
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set of activities including regulatory agency evaluations of safety claims
made by industry, simulated and live testing, presentation and analysis of
evidence, negotiation and argumentation.15
3. Safety assurance for autonomous vehicles
Autonomous vehicles are complex enough that complete safety
assurance may not be possible. If the computational methods that enable
autonomous driving systems were completely logic based, then it could be
possible to synthetically analyze safety or even do formal mathematical proof
of safety assurance. However, an autonomous vehicle’s ability to update
behavior based on experience and data makes such reasoning much less
powerful.16 Still, there is a need to define a starting point for evaluating the
coverage of assurance.
A series of assurance questions could be raised about whether the
intended design of an autonomous vehicle can provide a safe transportation
environment, assuming that it works as intended. For example, assurance is
affected by whether an intended sensing ability or an intended operational
limit on acceptable road surface conditions is sufficient to safely operate a
vehicle. It is critical that these assurance claims are based on functional
engineering measurements to enable testing of the realized product. A second
category of assurance questions could be considered about whether an
autonomous vehicle simply functions as intended. This second category of
assurance questions are more similar to traditional verification and validation
testing for traditional vehicles.

15

NAT’L INST. FOR STANDARDS AND TECH., FRAMEWORK FOR CYBER-PHYSICAL SYSTEMS:
VOLUME 1, OVERVIEW viii (2017), https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.1500-201 [https://
perma.cc/9QUN-KTXY].
16
Ming Liang, Bin Yang, Wenyan Zeng, Yun Chen, Rui Hu, Sergio Casas & Raquel Urtasun,
PnPNet: End-to-End Perception and Prediction With Tracking in the Loop, COMPUT. VISION
FOUND. 11553 (IEEE/CVF Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, 2020),
https://openaccess.thecvf.com/content_CVPR_2020/papers/Liang_PnPNet_End-toEnd_Perception_and_Prediction_With_Tracking_in_the_Loop_CVPR_2020_paper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/52RM-BYTH]; see Abbas Sadat, Mengye Ren, Andrei Pokrovsky, YenChen Lin, Ersin Yumer & Raquel Urtasun, Jointly Learnable Behavior and Trajectory
Planning for Self-Driving Vehicles 3951 (IEEE/RSJ Conference on Intelligent Robots and
Systems, 2019) [https://perma.cc/NHP5-E2TS] (explaining that the entire logic that
translates sensor input to driving commands is usually represented by an uninterpretable
neural network).
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B. Common Approaches to Safety Assurance
1. General aviation safety
Aviation safety assurance in the United States is formed by
overlapping precautionary and permissive regulatory agencies. The Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for monitoring and overseeing
industry-led safety procedures. FAA has developed the Safety Assurance
System (SAS) to track all required safety assurance activities including
functional safety, security, and pilot training.17 The unified system is there to
keep track of all the oversight activities in order to allow consideration of
how different safety assurance evidence may compound or conflict. SAS
automatically recommends regulatory action when oversight processes do
not meet the relevant FAA regulations.18
The overlapping agency is the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB), which does not do pre-incident oversight. NTSB does thorough
investigations of accidents and provides recommendations to airplane
manufacturers, operators, and the FAA.19 All parties usually implement the
recommendations.20 In addition to providing helpful recommendations that
improve safety in the long run, the NTSB has “Go Teams” who are on call
24/7 to rush to an accident scene as quickly as possible to gather evidence.
Communication with the media is a critical element of the NTSB’s job. They
have a reputation for conservative, respectful, truthful explanations of
harrowing events, which often helps to bring calm to the terror experienced
in the aftermath of an airplane crash.21
Autonomous vehicles could strongly benefit from similar NTSB
media communication in the wake of an accident since public perception of
AVs are critical for increased acceptance of the new technology.
However, general aviation safety is more similar to traditional vehicle
safety than AV safety, because all commercial planes are still required to have
pilots, even if flight guidance assistance or autopilot systems are engaged.22
17

See FED. AVIATION ADMIN., SAFETY ASSURANCE SYSTEM (2019),
https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/sas/ [https://perma.cc/8GM4-ZPBF] (explaining the
function of SAS).
18
FED. AVIATION ADMIN., WHAT IS THE FAA SAFETY ASSURANCE SYSTEM? AN OVERVIEW
FOR CERTIFICATE HOLDERS AND APPLICATIONS 25, 36 (2019).
19
Eric Fielding, Andrew W. Lo & Jian Helen Yang, The National Transportation Safety
Board: A Model for Systemic Risk Management, J INV. MGMT. 17, 19 (2011)
20
Id. at 7.
21
Id. at 12.
22
See MICHAEL KASZYCKI, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ADVISORY CIRCULAR NO. 25.1329-1C,
APPROVAL OF FLIGHT GUIDANCE SYSTEMS 14 (2014) https://www.faa.gov/documentLib
rary/media/Advisory_Circular/AC_25_1329-1C.pdf [https://perma.cc/T28N-4RD4]
(outlining the requirements of federal regulation).
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In fact, unlike human automobile drivers or even AV systems, aircraft pilots
are required to rigorously pass simulated flight tests in adverse conditions
before receiving their license.23
Autonomous unmanned aircraft are more similar in concept to
autonomous vehicles. Regulators will face the same basic questions—how
can do we assure that autonomous systems are safe and reliable for civil
aviation? Similar regulatory hurdles initially existed for unmanned
autonomous aircraft related to driver requirements—unmanned aircraft may
not operate in civil airspace without a Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) certificate of waiver or authorization (COA).24 There is also a strong
consensus that existing verification and validation methods are not adequate
to assure safe operation of an advanced autonomous system.25
While AV regulatory integration issues are mainly under the
assumption that a driver would always somehow recognize and take
extraordinary action in the case of a critical failure of a vehicle component,
unmanned aircraft face a different issue. Current aircraft regulations are
primarily concerned with protecting individuals inside planes, but unmanned
vehicle safety should focus on the safety of people on the ground.26
At the 2014 Verification & Validation Summit, a representative from
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) proposed a
sandbox-like approach where autonomous aircraft could only be allowed to
fly inside a particular geographic area that posed minimal risk while allowing
its intended purpose.27 The representative also proposed a design process and
product performance-based certification system that blended concepts of
operations approval with final fight tests and adverse condition simulations.28
2. Electricity grids
In regulation of the electricity grid, regional grid operators elect to
keep contingency plans for many possible permutations of asset failure.29 The
binding regulation is actually a performance standard called the Power
23

See Stan Greenspan, How Much of a Pilot's Training Is Emergency Landing Practices?,
SLATE (Mar. 20, 2017), https://slate.com/human-interest/2017/03/how-much-of-a-pilotstraining-is-emergency-landing-practices.html [https://perma.cc/S6KV-P7U3] (“Flying
lessons are not so much about flying but about emergencies”).
24
See NAT’L RSCH. COUNCIL, AUTONOMY RESEARCH FOR CIVIL AVIATION: TOWARD A NEW
ERA OF FLIGHT 3 (2014).
25
Id. at 37–38.
26
Id. at 41.
27
SHARON GRAVES, TRUSTED AUTONOMOUS SYSTEMS (9th Annual Verification &
Validation Summit, 2014).
28
Id. at 18.
29
IGNACIO PEREZ-ARRIAGA ET AL., UTILITY OF THE FUTURE: AN MIT ENERGY INITIATIVE
RESPONSE TO AN INDUSTRY IN TRANSITION 22–23 (2016).
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Quality Envelope.30 This standard is enforced by extremely high costs if the
grid fails to provide adequate power to consumers for a set number of hours
out of the year.31
This type of regulation for AV systems might involve standards
limiting the quantity of accidents, or other adverse driving events.
Conversely, a regulator could require that an AV must maintain certain
driving quality standards related to acceleration/deceleration to ensure that
passengers are safe and comfortable.32
3. Nuclear reactors
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) has established the
Reactor Oversight Process (ROP) to ensure the safety of operational nuclear
reactors. Under ROP, NRC designated seven key safety areas that require
constant measurement and reporting.33 These include event contingency
scenarios and emergency preparedness for initiation events and constant
state-of-health concerns such as radiation barrier integrity. NRC has
established measurement parameters that are reported on by the operators.34
Essentially, the only regulatory decision that is made is whether to increase
scrutiny beyond constant surveillance. If any of these seven factors are not
adequately addressed, then inspections and collaborative mitigation
procedures are triggered. This situation is a clear example of a precautionary
policy.35
Some states already require companies to report every traffic incident
involving an autonomous vehicle.36 With increased ability to transmit and
process data, it is possible that certain vehicle parameters could be regularly
reported to a regulatory agency. Even if those parameters were as simple as
sensor data for the ten seconds before and after an accident or near miss event,

30
ELENA FUMAGALLI, FLORENCE DELESTRE & LUCA LO SCHIAVO, HANDBOOK OF SERVICE
QUALITY REGULATION IN THE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION AND RETAIL SECTORS 79, 90
(2006) (outlining the regulatory instruments and process).
31
PEREZ-ARRIAGA, supra note 25, at 168.
32
Il Bae, Jaeyoung Moon & Jeongseok Seo, Toward a Comfortable Driving Experience for
a Self-Driving Shuttle Bus, 8 ELECS. 943, 944 (2019).
33
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, REACTOR OVERSIGHT PROCESS 2 (2021),
https://www.nrc.gov/reactors/operating/oversight.html (last visited Mar 25, 2021)
[https://perma.cc/7F2U-BEWS] (using a graphic to outline oversight framework).
34
U.S. NUCLEAR REGUL. COMM’N, MANAGEMENT DIRECTIVE 8.13, REACTOR OVERSIGHT
PROCESS 5–6 (2018), https://www.nrc.gov/docs/ML1734/ML17347B670.pdf [https://
perma.cc/PN4G-5Q4Q].
35
Id. at 9, 11.
36
CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE COLLISION REPORTS (2021)
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/vehicle-industry-services/autonomous-vehicles/autono
mous-vehicle-collision-reports/ [https://perma.cc/N8BA-HJFF].
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such data aggregation may allow regulators to detect systemic issues with
AVs earlier than they would if they waited for consumers to report
problems.37
4. FDA pre-market approval
In some areas of consumer protection regulation, Congress has chosen
to require pre-market approval for new products. The U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) oversees rigorous standards for proving effectiveness
and safety within guidelines developed through administrative law processes.
The main advantages of this type of system are higher trust in medical
products (which can lead to widespread adoption) and less preventable harm
to consumers. Major downsides include high costs, slower innovation (which
means that consumers must wait to receive products that could help them),
and still no guarantee that all detrimental effects are uncovered by the premarket testing process. In the context of human medicine, the wide variance
in human reaction to treatment and the long latency period of carcinogenic
harm represent the residual risk.
The FDA pre-market approval mechanism for new health care
treatments is notoriously expensive to navigate. Phase I and II of the approval
process involve small, randomized control trials to determine if treatments
are harmful and effective. In Phase III of the approval process, the treatment
is given to larger quantities of patients for the first time. This protracted
process causes innovation to move slowly because small improvements are
not worth re-applying for approval.38 In addition, once a treatment has
approval, most people assume that the treatment is entirely safe. Post market
evaluation is a low priority, although it does detect issues when the adverse
effects are severe or conspicuous (as they were with Thalidomide).39 A
rigorous pre-market testing program for AVs would be inappropriate and
antithetical to NHTSA’s goal of fostering innovation.
H.G. Eichner, Ken Oye, and others have proposed a change to the
FDA approval process that lowers the pre-market approval standard but
drastically raises the post-market study of treatments.40 They propose that
during the later stages of randomized control trials of a new treatment but
before the treatment is officially licensed, the treatment should be offered to
the any member of the public who wishes to take the treatment and also join
an observational data collection program. By allowing free entry into the
37

Id.
Rachel E. Sachs, Regulating Intermediate Technologies, 37 YALE J. REG. 219, 244–45
(2020).
39
H. G. Eichler et al., Adaptive Licensing: Taking the Next Step in the Evolution of Drug
Approval, 91 Clinical Pharmacology & Therapeutics 426, 432 (2012).
40
Id. at 434, 436.
38
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market but investing in the maintenance of public health data registries,
health care costs could be lower, innovation could move faster, and many
adverse effects would be detected that previously may never have been
discovered.41 This type of proposal is a rather extreme version of a sandbox
model, where the scope of initial tests are not very limited.
Regardless of what pre-market approval mechanism is adopted for
AVs, national registries of accident data and performance issues should be a
priority for continued research that will enable adaptive policy decision
making. Given the complexity of adaptive autonomous systems, statistical
analysis of overall performance may be one of the only ways that a regulator
could confidently assess the safety of an AV. While NHTSA currently
maintains accident data, expanding the type of data collected from drivers
could enable a measurement of safety assurance.
II. REGULATORY SANDBOXES
Regulatory sandboxes were first introduced in the United Kingdom in
2015 to regulate financial firms.42 In that context, they were meant to be “a
‘safe space’ in which businesses can test innovative products… without
immediately incurring all the normal regulatory consequences of engaging in
the activity in question.” The term “sandboxing” has traditionally been
limited to use in software development to describe a restricted environment
where it is safe to test untrusted code without fear of destroying equipment
or affecting other parts of a multi-person project.43
Typically, regulatory agencies take on the primary objective of public
safety, which can cause the agencies to lock in the status quo in an effort to
prevent new risks.44 In contrast, sandboxes allow experimental flexibility for
industry while still providing critical limitations to prevent public harm.
Jacob Sherkow, Professor at the University of Illinois College of Law,
described a regulatory sandbox as a policy to “allow developers to deploy the
technology in the wild to capture real-world user behavior and required the
developers to report data back to the agency so the agency can effectively
monitor the technology.”45 Sherkow also suggested that sandboxes have
certain process elements to make them effective: collect data, set up
procedures to adapt regulation in response to input from industry, grant

41

Id. at 427.
Jacob S. Sherkow, Regulatory Sandboxes and the Public Health, U. ILL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 9) (available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3792217).
43
Id.
44
Id. at 11.
45
Id. at 12.
42
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authorizations that are broad enough to cover iterations of new technologies,
use the real-world environment, and be limited in terms of use, scope, and
duration.46
A. Motivations and Characteristics
1. Tension between innovation and safety assurance
Traditional regulation can be conceptually placed on a spectrum that
describes the level of risk acceptance allowable in an industry. Usually, when
risk is low or widely dispersed, regulation is permissive.47 Permissive
regulation allows innovation and freedom unless consumer safety is
demonstrated to be clearly compromised by a particular company.
Enforcement of permissive regulation only occurs if adverse events actually
take place.48 Even under permissive regulation, the potential public backlash
to gross danger can cause temperance on the part of innovators.49 Permissive
regulation on its own does not reflect sandbox style regulation because
penalties for adverse events are severe, and because there are few limits on
the ability to tests new products. The balance between innovation and safety
is shifted towards innovation.
On the other hand, when risks are high or when impact is particularly
conspicuous, policies tend to be precautionary.50 Precautionary policies use
constant oversight and pre-market approval to test every innovation before
exposing the public to the risk it may pose.51 In the testing of autonomous
driving systems, a rigorous pre-market testing system could be developed. It
would likely involve hundreds of traffic situations, which must each be tested
46

Id.
H-G Eichler et al., supra note 35, at 427–28.
48
Fielding, supra note 15, at 27.
49
See NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., HWY18MH010, COLLISION BETWEEN VEHICLE
CONTROLLED BY DEVELOPMENTAL AUTOMATED DRIVING SYSTEM AND PEDESTRIAN (2019)
(Identifying the probable causes of a crash involving a pedestrian, Elaine Herzberg, and an
Uber test vehicle in Tempe, Arizona); Ryan Randazzo, Who Was Really at Fault in Fatal
Uber Crash?, AZCENTRAL (Mar. 17, 2019), https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/local/
tempe/2019/03/17/one-year-after-self-driving-uber-rafaela-vasquez-behind-wheel-crashdeath-elaine-herzberg-tempe/1296676002/ [https://perma.cc/NVT9-J82P] (“The fallout
from the Tempe crash . . . would promptly drive Uber’s autonomous program out of
Arizona”).
50
Fall 2010 Recap: Risk Regulation Seminar Series, REG. REV. (Nov. 22, 2010),
https://www.theregreview.org/2010/11/22/fall-2010-recap-risk-regulation-seminar-series/
[https://perma.cc/B77R-MNEK].
51
Nicolas A. Ashford, The Legacy of the Precautionary Principle in U.S. Law: The Rise of
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Risk Assessment as Undermining Factors in Health, Safety and
Environmental Protection, in IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: APPROACHES
FROM THE NORDIC COUNTRIES, EU & USA 352, 353 (2012), http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1
/38470 [https://perma.cc/HVU7-78UL].
47
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multiple times for different environmental and operational conditions.
Significant testing of failure response would also be required. This brief
description underestimates the difficulty and time that would be required to
conduct such testing. Setting such a high bar for pre-market approval would
add cost and slow down innovation in a nascent industry and may hurt the
competitiveness of American manufacturers. Precautionary regulation does
not constitute sandbox style regulation. Here, the balance between innovation
and safety is shifted towards safety.
Regulatory sandboxes are intended to be used in environments where
innovation needs a push to overcome a strict regulatory environment. Cass
Sunstein, who served as administrator of the Office of Information and
Regulatory Affairs during the Obama administration, has criticized overregulation of new technologies as “counter-productive, ineffective, [and]
overly costly”.52 While innovation can benefit from clarity in liability rules,
strict prescription to particular technologies or even specific operational
performance metrics can stifle innovation if implemented too early in the life
of an industry.53
Often, executive agencies deal with this problem by waiving
regulations for developing technologies wholesale. For instance, the EPA has
the authority to waive air pollution control regulations for potential polluters
who are testing a new pollution control technology.54 But this type of waiver
is more dangerous when unregulated industry could cause immediate health
effects. Instead of a waiver, agency-granted permission to test well defined
new technologies for limited amounts of time with the promise to share data
describing the results would provide industry with an avenue for less
encumbered innovation while still ensuring public safety.
2. Collect evidence of safety and efficacy for new technologies
Data collection is a critical aspect of regulatory sandbox design, and
one that is likely to be hotly contested by market participants.55 Collection
and reporting of data from industry testing is costly, and companies are often
rightly concerned about the security and publicity that reported data may
receive.

52
Cass Sunstein, Administrative Substance, 1991 Duke L.J. 607, 630–31 (1991) (explaining
the mixed record of regulation).
53
Nicholas A. Ashford & Ralph P. Hall, Regulation-Induced Innovation for Sustainable
Development, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 21, 21 (2012) (explaining the Porter hypothesis,
which asserts that some environmental regulations can encourage technological innovation,
and the impact of regulation on innovation).
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42 U.S.C. § 7411.
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For AV manufacturers that participate in a regulatory sandbox, a
specific set of data should be collected that includes, as a minimum, blackbox sensor input and control data in the ten seconds before a disengagement.
Disengagements are instances in which a human operator must retake control
of the car. These data are critical for regulators to understand not only
frequency of accidents but also causes.
Sharing of black-box data from all disengagements would provide
regulators with an opportunity to making decisions about the safety of an AV
prototype prior to accidents. This is appropriate because accidents occur so
infrequently on the road. The RAND Corporation estimates that using
frequency of accidents and disengagements during on-road testing alone
would require more than 500 years at current testing rates to show that
autonomous vehicles are as safe as human drivers. The same RAND study
concluded that autonomous vehicles “cannot drive their way to safety” and
suggested that more rigorous data needs to be collected.
If NHTSA had the ability to review black-box data from
disengagements in a way that preserved competition between firms within
the regulatory sandbox program, then the agency may be able to develop
technical expertise that moves the whole industry forward. Still, under such
a program, it would be critical that NHTSA take careful precautions to make
sure that any such data shared with the agency is secure enough to prevent
discovery by press analysts or competing firms.
The type of data that is collected and reported should be specified by
the design of the sandbox. Allowing industry to report only high-level
summaries, or to report only data that they deem to be relevant will not
provide agencies with the ability to meaningfully analyze safety features.
Public safety should be prioritized over innovative ease when it comes to data
collection in defining rules for sandboxes for AVs.
3. Adapt regulation in response to input from industry
During the sandbox period, a system of ongoing dialogue between
regulators and industry should include the ability to update the sandbox
without the need for formal agency rulemaking procedures.56
This type of adaptive policy aspires to capture the benefits of both
permissive and precautionary policy by fostering initial applications,
products, or technologies that have low risk, but still providing an opportunity

56

See Sherkow, supra note 38, at 29 (describing how developers’ input throughout the
application process shaped COVID-19 Emergency Use Agreements).
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to observe and update prior knowledge of risk over time.57 It would involve
a multi-step process that begins with presenting regulators with evidence of
the benefits and risks of potential innovations.58
Adaptive policies are defined by an ability to update practices and
regulations based on new information without formal rulemaking. A formal
rule may establish a process for continued re-evaluation of permitted activity,
rather than a static rule.59 This would mean that when industry decides to
innovate in a new direction, the agency is able to amend sandbox rules to
permit that testing. It also means that the agency could quickly rescind testing
authorizations when new evidence shows that risks are too high.
Establishing an intermediate evidentiary threshold for qualification to
participation in the regulatory sandbox is appropriate. For instance, FDA’s
Emergency Use Authorization may authorize a drug under more relaxed
evidentiary standards than its traditional pre-market approval system.60 All
that is a required is a “reasonable belief” that the product will be effective,
and that “reasonable belief” can be demonstrated by the “totality of scientific
evidence”, including data from testing on animals and the laboratory.61
In addition, FDA requires a risk-benefit analysis be made in the
context of the emergency situation. While the minimum evidentiary threshold
is set at “totality of scientific evidence,” the risk-benefit analysis part of the
framework allows FDA to tailor its requirements for EUAs to the specific
situations in which they are used.62 For instance, FDA still required extensive
pre-EUA human clinical trials for COVID-19 vaccine safety, recognizing that
maintaining public trust in the agency is an important part of national public
health strategy.63
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4. Grant broad authorizations for iterations of new technologies
Part of the challenge of regulatory sandboxes is that limited
authorizations to test could quickly become obsolete when state of the art
technology surpasses the definitions provided by the authorization.64 On the
other hand, authorizations that are too broad might not meet the agency’s
safety assurance needs.65 In addition, authorizations that prescribe the use of
particular technologies can be the result of regulatory capture and can lead to
technology lock-in effects.66 This challenge could be solved by attempting to
adopt technology-neutral authorizations only.67
For autonomous vehicle development, the Department of
Transportation (DOT) is particularly concerned that rigid, technology
specific policies will stifle innovation. They have already adopted the policy
to support the development of voluntary, consensus-based technical
standards and approaches that are flexible and adaptable over time.68 This
commitment could work well with a regulatory sandbox approach in which
technology-neutral authorizations were granted for testing certain classes of
products that document the use of various technical approaches without
prescribing any of them.
5. Use the real-world environment
One important characteristic of regulatory sandboxes is that they
allow industry to test products in the real-world environment. Two prior
examples are financial products approved by the U.K.’s regulatory sandbox
for financial technology (FinTech) and FDA’s Emergency Use
Authorizations (EUAs) in the U.S. The obvious challenge is that exposing
the public to products that are not assured to be safe necessarily exposes the
public to risk.
This highlights the reason that sandboxes should only be used in areas
where innovation is both necessary and where simulation or testing in
controlled environments are not sufficient or possible. For financial products,
64

See id. at 31 (noting that “each EUA is specific to a particular product”).
See id.at 13 (contending that the experimental nature of regulatory sandboxes creates a
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understanding consumer response to FinTech products required testing on
real customers. For the FDA’s Emergency Use Authorization program, the
time pressure of the COVID-19 pandemic meant traditional pre-market
testing in clinical trials would be too slow.
6. Limited in terms of use, scope, and duration
Sandboxes balance the risks of real-world testing by limiting the
authorized activity in use, scope, and duration. Limiting product testing by
use provides boundaries for how the product interacts with the world. Each
new financial product in the U.K. had to define the boundaries of its intended
use before getting authorization.
Limitations on scope narrow the area of the real world that can be
affected by the untested technology. For autonomous vehicles, pilot programs
that limit the use of the vehicle to a college campus or retirement community
are examples of scope limitations.
Limitations on duration prevent the regulatory sandbox from
becoming a permanent regulatory fixture. While a regulatory sandbox
provides a way for the new technology to develop and a way for regulators
to learn more about the technology, regulatory sandboxes do not protect the
public to the extent that evidentiary standards are lower than normal. They
also do not carry the helpful public accountability features of formal
rulemaking. Finally, regulatory sandbox operation can be resource intensive
for the agency since proper administration requires constant re-consideration
of available evidence. Defining a limitation of the duration of the sandbox
give all parties the opportunity to move to a more stable regulatory
environment.
7. Challenges of sandboxes - public trust
One of the primary challenges that sandboxes pose is that they
endanger public trust in a regulatory agency. This trust comes from the fact
that real-world testing without high evidentiary standards stands in stark
contrast with the precautionary tendencies that most agencies exhibit. It also
stems from the fact that close collaboration with industry poses transparency
difficulties, because industry is unwilling to share proprietary information
unless they receive assurance that it will not be disclosed to the public.
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These issues were both at play for FDA in its use of Emergency Use
Authorizations for drugs and vaccines to fight COVID-19. Polling data
suggests that many Americans are skeptical of vaccines and lack confidence
in that FDA is providing the country with trustworthy information.69
For autonomous vehicles, the data collected by prototypes is
immensely valuable to developers, and public disclosure of detailed ride data
is not likely to be possible. This could lead to tensions between agency
transparency to the public, and the agency’s ability to access truly useful data.
III. CURRENT AUTONOMOUS VEHICLE REGULATIONS
A. The Traditional U.S. Model for Regulating Automobile Safety
1. Federal law
a. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards
Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards (FMVSS) are U.S. federal
vehicle regulations that require particular design and performance
requirements for all motor vehicles operated on public roads.70 After an
FMVSS is issued, automakers certify that they have complied with the
FMVSS before selling a vehicle. NHTSA spot checks random vehicles sold
to the public for FMVSS compliance.
No current FMVSS applies to autonomous vehicles, but in the long
run, NHTSA could issue an industry-wide FMVSS that specifies
technological details about technologies and testing required for use in
autonomous vehicles. All federal regulatory actions must follow the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and state regulations must follow
equivalent statutes in their respective jurisdictions. The most important
aspects of the APA are the requirement for notice-and-comment periods and
the prohibition of “arbitrary and capricious” rulemaking. Agencies must
publicly propose rules, give the public a chance to file comments, and then
substantively respond to the comments at the time the final rule is announced

69

Public Trust in CDC, FDA, and Fauci Holds Steady, Survey Shows, ANNENBERG PUB.
POL'Y CTR., (Jul. 20, 2021) https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/public-trust-incdc-fda-and-fauci-holds-steady-survey-shows/ [https://perma.cc/88B4-SFR4]. See also
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70
49 C.F.R. § 571 (2006).

212

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

in order to satisfy the APA.71 To avoid being found invalid in federal court
for being arbitrary and capricious, a policy must pass a cost-benefit analysis
and be based on relevant information after documented consideration.72
b. NHTSA investigation-recall mechanism
The United States Code for Motor Vehicle Safety (Title 49, Chapter
301) defines motor vehicle safety as “the performance of a motor vehicle or
motor vehicle equipment in a way that protects the public against
unreasonable risk of accidents occurring because of the design, construction,
or performance of a motor vehicle, and against unreasonable risk of death or
injury in an accident and includes nonoperational safety of a motor vehicle.”73
A defect includes “any defect in performance, construction, a component, or
material of a motor vehicle or motor vehicle equipment.”74 Generally, a
safety defect is defined as a problem that exists in a motor vehicle or item of
equipment that both poses a risk to safety and exists in a group of vehicles of
the same design or manufacture.75
NHTSA relies on consumer reporting to identify defects. Agency
technical experts review every call, letter, and online report of an alleged
safety problem filed with NHTSA. If safety issue reports and consumer
petitions for investigation pass a screening process, then NHTSA will
investigate a safety defect.76 There is no established number of reports that
will trigger an agency investigation.77
During the investigative phase, Office of Defects Investigation (ODI)
obtains information from the manufacturer (including data on complaints,
crashes, injuries, warranty claims, modifications, and part sales) and
determines whether further analysis is warranted.78 At this stage, the
71
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manufacturer has an opportunity to present its views regarding the alleged
defect.79 Investigations are generally closed on the basis that further
investigation is not warranted, or because the manufacturer has decided to
conduct a recall.80 If ODI determines that more information is required, an
investigator will undertake a more rigorous analysis.81
If ODI determines that a safety-related defect could exist, then the
ODI investigator briefs a panel of experts from within the agency. If the panel
concurs, the ODI will notify the manufacturer of the impending recall. At
ODI’s discretion, the manufacturer may present new data before the recall
takes effect. Only once the agency has finalized a decision to order a recall,
may the manufacturer challenge the order in federal district court. Likewise,
once the order is issued, a court may compel the manufacturer to comply.82
c. National Transportation Safety Board Review
The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is an independent
federal agency with a reputation for objectivity charged by statutory mandate
to investigate accidents in the transportation sector.83
NTSB is an effective consumer protection agency in large part
because their recommendations are carefully chosen to be specific and
achievable. NTSB has a track record of working with agencies and other
organizations to get them to follow through on adopting the
recommendations. For instance, the NTSB estimates that the FAA has
adopted 80% of the NTSB’s safety recommendations.84
d. NHTSA and IHSA rating systems
There are two US-based systems that many automakers and
consumers rely on to test and rate car safety: NHTSA’s Stars on Cars Safety
Rating and the Insurance Institute for Highway Safety (IIHS) Safety Ratings.
These systems both rely on frontal, side barrier, side pole, and rollover tests.
After a series of crash tests, NHTSA bases its ratings on the likelihood of
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being injured — with a 5-star rating going to the safest vehicle possible.85
This typically means that the vehicle has scored “good” on multiple crash
tests. NHTSA ratings are often included on car comparison websites to help
quickly discern which cars are safest.86 While autonomous vehicles will be
measured by these rating systems, the driverless aspect of the vehicle is not
likely to affect its performance on these metrics.
NHTSA’s five-star safety rating system is a pre-market mechanism,
but it does not involve approval. The rating system is based on a series of
compliance tests to make sure that vehicles have recommended features
enabled, such as proper airbags, and limited standard crash safety
performance tests. Given the clear objectives for safety, almost all vehicles
are able to meet the guidelines.
Given enough time after consumers begin to use AVs, IIHS or other
groups may try to develop rating systems. The difficulty of developing tests
that completely assure safety is described below, but qualitative ratings may
be an effective way to communicate with consumers and differentiate
between the levels of safety of existing AVs. Such rating systems will likely
be performance based. As with the current systems, each star in the rating
system should have a specific meaning indicating what tests a vehicle passed
if it receives that star. If AV developers and regulators adopt a practice of
producing and sharing information about a vehicle’s operations state space,
then rating systems become more powerful tools. The tests that such rating
system developers conduct can evaluate the vehicles operational state space
on widely understood metrics which enables better reasoning about the
performance of the vehicle beyond the immediate results of the test.
2. State laws
For automakers navigating an overlapping system of laws, the
automotive industry has a long history of managing differences in safety
regulations between states and countries through homologation processes.87
State and local regulations exist alongside federal rules governing how
autonomous vehicles are tested and deployed. The National Governors
Association (NGA) has claimed a role for state governments to govern
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vehicle and pedestrian safety, privacy, cybersecurity, and linkage with
advanced communications networks.88
B. Autonomous Vehicles Policy
Multiple federal and state regulatory mechanisms affect the
development of autonomous vehicles. FMVSS are designed for traditional
vehicles and need to be updated so that vehicles remain safe when no driver
is present. NHTSA also has the authority to grant temporary exemptions from
FMVSS for new technologies, which they have already granted to one
autonomous vehicle developer, Nuro, for road testing.89 A recent proposed
rule indicated that NHTSA may impose a new safety assessment reporting
requirement on vehicle manufacturers that must be submitted prior to testing
or deployment of autonomous vehicles on public roads.90 NHTSA has
already been receiving such assessments on a voluntary basis. The NTSB
takes particular interest in accidents that involve autonomous vehicles and
have already conducted a full-scale investigation of an autonomous vehicle
accident that killed a pedestrian. Additionally, states may get involved in
regulating autonomous vehicles through their authority to regulate drivers,
vehicle registration, traffic laws and enforcement, insurance, and liability.91
Exemptions from FMVSSs and federal and state safety assessment
reporting form aspects of a regulatory sandbox, but NTSB investigations and
the eventual application of product recall mechanisms do not align with the
regulatory sandbox model.
1. Retroactive integration of FMVSSs
The road performance of autonomous vehicles may differ
significantly than cars with human drivers. Response times, driving styles,
and ability to perceive certain traffic situations are different for AVs, which
means that FMVSSs that were established under the assumption that human
drivers would be operating vehicles will not achieve the same levels of safety
when applied to an autonomous vehicle. The U.S. DOT has indicated that
they will modernize or eliminate outdated regulations that unnecessarily
impede the development of automated vehicles.92 For instance, DOT may
88
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remove references to drivers and operators of vehicles that are exclusively
defined to be human. In a recent proposed rule, NHTSA announced that it
would interpret “driver” as referring to the driving system, and not to any of
the vehicle occupants. If no human occupant of the vehicle can actually drive
the vehicle, it is more reasonable to identify the “driver” as whatever entity
is doing the driving.93 As of March 2020, NHTSA is not revising the overall
regulatory definition of “driver.” Instead, the agency proposed to augment
the definition with “supporting or clarifying definitions to indicate when the
FMVSS is referring to a human driver or an autonomous driving system.”94
All previous vehicle safety regulations assumed that a driver would
be present. The tolerance thresholds for whether a particular type of vehicle
system failure was acceptable have been set on the assumption that a human
driver would be ready to take a non-standard action to achieve a safe
outcome. This has several implications for AVs. The AV itself could address
this problem technically. AVs could self-monitor vehicle system function in
order to make proper decisions. A systems ability to properly self-monitor
may be one whole area of safety assurance testing. For instance, if a tire
suddenly becomes flat, the AV should be able to recognize the situation, or it
may make inappropriate decisions. Second, when humans make decisions in
response to system failures, drivers can provide some limitation on the
liability that manufacturers face. AV developers will not have that potential
liability shield.
2. Federal exemptions
NHTSA has the authority to grant an exemption from existing
FMVSS’s to vehicle manufacturers for up to 2,500 vehicles per year. This
authority has traditionally only been used for unique vehicles like armorplated security vans with components that are too heavy to comply with some
federal standards.95
NHTSA granted an application for FMVSS exemptions to Nuro Inc.,
an autonomous vehicle developer in 2020. Nuro’s exemption allows it to
operate low-speed delivery robots on public roads. NHTSA will monitor the
testing. Nuro is required to report its operations and outcomes to NHTSA.96
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Exemptions of this kind fit the model for regulatory sandboxes. The
FMVSS exemptions permit real-world testing, require data collection and
ongoing collaboration between industry and the regulator, and they are
limited in scope and duration.
In April 2021, Congress considered legislation that would authorize
the Secretary of Transportation to provide regulatory exemptions for a larger
set number of vehicles per year, reportedly up to 80,000, allowing automakers
greater freedom to test in advance of a formal NHTSA rulemaking.97
3. Permitting under state and local law
Many state and local government organizations have called for reform
to federal autonomous vehicle policy.98 A joint letter to the Chairs of the
Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House
Committee on Energy and Commerce called for affirmation that state and
local governments can promulgate new statutes and regulations governing
roadway safety, for required submission of more detailed AV manufacturer
reports, for greater safety assurance, for legal differentiation between pilot
testing programs and commercial sale of autonomous vehicles, and for
consumer education on safe use of autonomous vehicles.99
The National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) maintains a list of
states that consider legislation related to autonomous vehicles.100 NSCL
reports that twenty-nine states have recently enacted legislation, but that less
than ten related to vehicle testing, licensing, or liability.101 Most legislation
is related to definition updates and commercial requirements related to truck
platooning.102

97

David Shepardson, Two U.S. Senators Make New Push to Advance Self-Driving Cars,
REUTERS, (Apr. 22, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-two-us-senatorsmake-new-push-advance-self-driving-cars-2021-04-22/ [https://perma.cc/ZNW3-ZAMB];
see also Maggie Miller, Congress Makes Renewed Push on Self-driving Cars Bill, THE HILL,
(Feb. 17, 2021), https://thehill.com/policy/technology/539063-congress-makes-renewedpush-on-self-driving-cars-bill [https://perma.cc/P7UD-ZCWQ].
98
NAT’L ASS’N OF GOVERNORS, GOVERNORS STAYING AHEAD OF THE TRANSPORTATION
INNOVATION CURVE: A POLICY ROADMAP FOR STATES 24–25 (2018).
99
Letter from Stephen Handy & David Tarnas to James C. Owens, Acting Administrator
Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin. (Jan. 18, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/
Documents/standcomm/scnri/NHTSA_ADS_ANPRM_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Q
XV-GN34].
100
Autonomous Vehicles | Self-Driving Vehicles Enacted Legislation, NAT'L CONFERENCE
OF STATE LEGS. (Feb. 18, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/autonomousvehicles-self-driving-vehicles-enacted-legislation.aspx [https://perma.cc/XZK4-UJPU].
101
Id.
102
Id.

218

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

California, Arizona, Michigan, Florida, and Pennsylvania are
considered state leaders in developing laws related to the permitting and
deployment of autonomous vehicles.103 States that have passed legislation in
this area tend to be very accommodating to AV developers because they are
in competition to be the location of new development and economic
growth.104 It may be possible that this competition ends in disaster, with
meaningfully restrictive licensing at the state level only after a high-profile
accident. For instance, the 2019 NTSB report highlighted Arizona’s relaxed
permitting process as one of the contributing factors in the cause of a fatal
crash.105
4. California
California Vehicle Code (CVC) Section 38750 charges the DMV with
the responsibility to adopt regulations governing the testing of AVs.106 The
California DMV requires that any operator of an AV within the state obtain
a permit and have extensive personal accident and liability insurance.107 More
than 50 companies hold testing permits.108
In terms of safety assurance, the permit application requires a
mandatory safety self-assessment report, not unlike that requested by
NHTSA. Specifically, the safety report must include a description of the area
and road conditions under which a vehicle is designed to operate.109 Safety
reports are not publicly available, because they are the property of the
applying party.
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In addition, California prohibits operation of a vehicle without a
driver prepared to take control of the vehicle in case of autonomous mode
failure.110 AV manufacturers are also not permitted to receive compensation
for providing a ride to members of the public.111
California requires both collision and disengagement data reporting.
If an AV is involved in a collision, the California DMV requires
manufacturers to publicly report the incident.112 If the vehicle’s autonomous
driving system disengages, the California DMV requires manufacturers to
report the location, the whether the vehicle was operating with a driver, a
brief description of the facts that caused the disengagement, and the party that
caused the disengagement.113
Taken as a whole, California’s approach provides some oversight
without imposing costly limitations on AV developers. In this way, it follows
the sandbox model by collecting some data, and allowing limited real-world
testing. However, it does place liability for accidents solely on developers
through its self-assurance and insurance requirements. In the long run,
innovation may happen faster if states were to take responsibility for safety
assurance, giving developers a clear hurdle to hit and beyond which they can
innovate without great risk of liability.114
5. Voluntary safety self-assessments
As many of the current Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards do
not apply directly autonomous vehicles, NHTSA calls on manufacturers of
the autonomous vehicles and developers of cyber-physical systems to
voluntary comply with several recommendations made in their automated
vehicles policy.115 The guidance organizes the recommendations into a
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fifteen-point assessment for manufacturers of autonomous vehicles and
developers of cyber-physical systems to consider when following safety
expectations:
1. Data sharing—cyber-physical systems already account for this
point which recommends de-identifying collected data and
sharing information with appropriate parties for the development
of best practices and for crash reconstruction purposes;
2. Privacy—human drivers should be provided with a clear
understanding of what kind of data is being collected;
3. System safety—cyber-physical systems must respond safely to
software malfunctions, near crashes, loss of traction, etc.;
4. Vehicle cybersecurity—cyber-physical systems designs already
account for this point which recommends that security be
considered from the design phase;
5. Human-machine interface—cyber-physical system designs must
account for how the human driver, other cars, pedestrians, and
people with disabilities will interact with the automated system;
6. Crashworthiness—vehicles operated by cyber-physical systems
must comply with NHTSA standards applicable to non-automated
vehicles;
7. Consumer education and training—car manufacturers must train
sales staff and educate consumers about the capabilities and
limitations of automated systems;
8. Registration and certification—any significant updates or new
automated features must be submitted in a new Safety Assessment
report to NHTSA;
9. Post-crash behavior—car manufacturers that use cyber-physical
systems should prove that their cars are safe to use again after a
crash;
10. Compliance with Federal, State, and local laws—cyber-physical
systems should comply with all applicable laws;
11. Ethical considerations—automated systems should be
programmed to account for ethical dilemmas;
12. Operational Design Domain—cyber-physical system designs
should clearly define and document the driving conditions under
which the automated system is designed to operate in;
13. Object and event detection and response—cyber-physical systems
must be able to perceive and respond to normal driving situations
gov/files/documents/voluntary_safety_self-assessment_for_web_101117_v1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/P8FN-MJKJ] (last visited Mar. 8, 2021) (illustrating some information that
manufacturers and other entities involved in the development of automated driving systems
“may want to provide to the public to demonstrate how they are addressing safety”).
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like navigating traffic, heeding traffic signs, avoiding car crashes,
etc.;
14. Fall back (Minimal Risk Condition)—cyber-physical system
designs should have a failsafe when encountering malfunctions
and should be able to safely switch control to the human driver;
15. Validation methods—developers of cyber-physical systems must
use tests and validation methods ensure a high level of safety in
the operation of the automated vehicles.
While the Safety Assessment is just a recommendation by NHTSA to
automated systems developers, the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) recommended that NHTSA should make self-driving vehicle safety
assessments mandatory and ensure automated vehicles have appropriate
safeguards.116
The DOT’s guidance under the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy
primarily supports the development of voluntary technical standards.117 This
would involve asking manufacturers to evaluate AV safety claims. However,
if those tests are to be credible, then the parameters and protocols of those
tests must be transparent and verifiable.
6. The technological sandbox: Operational Design Domain (ODD)
Engineers who develop autonomous vehicles already formally selfimpose some limitations on the autonomous vehicle testing through the use
of an Operational Design Domain (ODD) concept. An ODD is a list of the
operating conditions for which a particular AV prototype is designed. For
instance, these limitations commonly include weather, time-of-day,
“geographical, and time-of-day restrictions, and/or the requisite presence or
absence of certain traffic or roadway characteristics.”118 ODDs take the form
of a narrative, so that the indented use of the prototype can be communicated
to all stakeholders.119 Currently, autonomous vehicle manufacturers develop
an ODD for each system they build.120
The operational design domain concept could be considered a
technological regulatory sandbox. Engineers allow autonomous vehicles to
116

NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 49, at 3.
See Autonomous Vehicles 4.0, supra note 5, at 29 (describing the federal government’s
promotion of voluntary consensus standards through multiple updates of the Federal
Automated Vehicles Policy, of which 4.0 is the latest).
118
SAE INTERNATIONAL, Taxonomy and Definitions for Terms Related to Driving
Automation Systems for On-Road Motor Vehicles, J3016_201806. at 14.
119
Nathan Eddy, ODD Collaboration Needed for Autonomous-Vehicle Safety, IWCE'S
URGENT COMMUNICATIONS (Jan. 20, 2021) https://urgentcomm.com/2021/01/20/odd-collab
oration-needed-for-autonomous-vehicle-safety/ [https://perma.cc/AVG6-USF9].
120
CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, Autonomous Vehicle Deployment Checklist (Form OL
321) (2018)
117

222

Journal of Law and Public Affairs

[December 2021

operate within certain limitations. If nothing else, ODD-style limitations on
the operations of autonomous vehicles could be a platform for collaboration
between regulators and industry within a regulatory sandbox. Already, both
the California DOT and NHTSA request that autonomous vehicle testing
companies report their ODDs. However, neither regulator has taken the
initiative to create ODDs themselves.
The limitation of using ODDs as a basis for a regulatory sandbox is
that they are not intended to be specific or complete enough to assure vehicle
safety. Safety claims that rely on an ODD would be difficult to test. For
instance, if a vehicle manufacturer were to submit a VSSA for a vehicle with
an ODD that claims the vehicle will operate in light snow, then several tests
would be needed to evaluate that claim. First, tests should demonstrate that
the vehicle can safely operate in light snow. Second, tests should demonstrate
that the vehicle responds appropriately to heavy snow. As a preliminary
measure, the test should demonstrate that the vehicle recognizes that it has
encountered heavy snow. Then, a more general test showing that the vehicle
can reach a minimal risk condition in heavy snow should be required to
evaluate the safety claim based on the ODD. Not all elements of the ODD are
safety relevant, but even testing compliance of all safety relevant ODD claims
would take significant resources, especially for difficult to control
environmental conditions.
7. Investigation-recall mechanism for autonomous vehicles
Current recall assessment policy would apply to autonomous
vehicles. If consumers report safety issues or petition NHTSA to open a
defect investigation, then NHTSA’s ODI will evaluate the reports and follow
standard defect protocol for evaluating the problems. The use of this
regulatory pathway is not likely to be relevant until consumers are able to
purchase and use autonomous vehicles.
8. National Transportation Safety Board review
NTSB has already ruled on a high-profile AV related incident—a
2018 accident in which a pedestrian was killed by an Uber Technologies test
vehicle in Arizona. The NTSB investigation found that the probable cause of
the accident was the failure of the human driver to monitor the operation of
the AV because of distraction caused by her cell phone.121 NTSB was able to
report that that the AV detected an object 5.6 seconds before the crash, but
never classified that object as a pedestrian.122

121
122

NAT’L TRANSP. SAFETY BD., supra note 49, at 4.
Id. at 1.

Vol. 7:1]

Regulatory Sandboxes

223

NTSB’s report went further than the immediate cause of the incident.
It also uncovered an “inadequate safety culture” at Uber Technologies,
condemned the engineering decision to disable the vehicle’s collision
warning and automatic emergency braking mechanism, and found that weak
government regulation around driver training and distraction also partially
caused the accident.123 NTSB included specific recommendations for all
parties involved to improve their policies, and also recommended that the
American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators coordinate
knowledge transfer about the crash to other states and assist in developing
stricter testing permit requirements.124
C. Other Possible Approaches
1. A driver’s license for autonomous vehicles
One possible solution to safety assurance is that states develop a kind
of drivers licensing exam for AVs. For human drivers, licensing exams are
not intended to provide full-coverage safety assurance. Rather, they provide
an assurance that an individual can operate a vehicle at a minimum level of
ability. This typically involves testing informational awareness about
identification of road features and vehicle operation, capability testing related
to vision and reaction time and includes requirements to demonstrate limited
operational maneuvers within a very defined scope, and training hour
requirements. Each of these aspects to a human licensing exam could have an
analogue for licensing an AV system.
While this type of safety assurance process is tempting due to its
simplicity, policymakers should avoid such a program. First, it would likely
confuse consumers into thinking that autonomous vehicles are to be
considered safe. Second, the types of tests that an autonomous vehicle
“driver’s license” would entail could be easily gamed by AV developers,
making the test less indicative of actual roadworthiness. The most uncertain
aspect of AV safety is not in ability to perform in well-defined, well-known
scenarios, but in the wide range of unforeseeable scenarios that may occur on
the road.
2. Resorting to tort law
Liability is an underlying issue of autonomous vehicles regulation.
Autonomous vehicle developers face a difficult legal landscape because
judges and juries are often biased against machines when they are at fault for
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injury or death.125 Although the specific principles and criteria tend to vary
somewhat from state to state, manufacturers can be held liable in tort under
three general theories: negligent design, failure to warn, and (quasi) strict
liability.
Tort claims can be divided into three component parts. First is what
is sometimes called the liability component: the plaintiff must establish that
the defendant’s actions or inactions were sufficient to hold the defendant
legally responsible for harm caused to the plaintiff. Second is causation: the
plaintiff must establish that the connection between the defendant’s actions
or inactions and the plaintiff’s harm is sufficient to warrant a conclusion that
the defendant was the legal cause of plaintiff’s harm. Third is damages: the
plaintiff must establish that the harm suffered is of a type for which the law
will award monetary compensation (or “damages”) to the plaintiff.
Proving the damages component is generally not an issue for plaintiffs
injured as a result of vehicle crashes. The other two components, however,
have proven to be significant obstacles in cases seeking to hold manufacturers
liable for injuries. The principles of negligence and strict products liability
differ as to the liability component in all states, and as to the causation
component in some states. Regardless of the precise formulation in the
particular state, however, an individual court’s definition of what appropriate
public policy is in this area looms large. To hold an AV manufacturer liable
in negligence for injuries inflicted by an accident caused by the autonomous
vehicle, the plaintiff needs to show: (1) that the manufacturer owed a duty to
the plaintiff to adhere to a particular standard of care; and (2) that the
manufacturer “breached” that duty by failing to adhere to the requisite
standard of care.
3. International approaches to AV safety assurance
In some countries, the operation of a vehicle on a public road almost
always requires a driver, unless specifically exempted.126 The 1968 United
Nations Convention on Road Traffic led to a treaty that required that a human
driver is always responsible for the behavior of their vehicle in traffic.127
However, countries all over the world are enacting limited permitting
125
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programs. Singapore was recently ranked first on an index of pro-AV policy
and legislation because it consolidated autonomous vehicle regulations to a
single national agency (the Land Transport Authority) and nationally funded
pilot programs with S$6 million (US$4.3 million).128 Singapore has also
released a national standard to promote safe deployment.129
Denmark has a strong testbed environment, but an application
procedure that requires a year or more.130 One unique feature of the Danish
approach is that applications require approval a third-party safety assessor.131
CONCLUSION
Policy makers should make careful use of this period of autonomous
vehicle technology development. Today, autonomous vehicles are being
tested only in limited places, but preparations must be made for a more
widespread transition. Because of the economic promise and potential safety
benefits that autonomous vehicles hold, it is certain that road transportation
will become 100% autonomous, but it is not certain how quickly a thorough
transformation will occur.132 The question of when benefits from autonomous
vehicles can be realized will be strongly influenced by the speed and
efficiency of regulatory action to aid the technology adoption process.
In the early stages of development, autonomous vehicle development
companies are incentivized to optimize on consumer safety in order to win
the public’s trust. Once the public’s trust is gained, it is possible that AV
companies optimize on other features, such as convenience, luxury, or speed
at the expense of safety, which consumers may unwittingly accept. Just as
Indiana Jones switched the priceless archeological artifact out for a bag of
sand in the movie, regulation must step in precisely at that moment to
preserve safety features in lieu of market forces that incentivize AV design
on non-safety features. NHTSA’s success in developing appropriate formal
rules governing AV design and performance depends on gathering thorough
information from AV developers, starting as early as possible.
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The use of limited exemptions from current regulatory requirements
for automobiles in support of on-road testing of highly autonomous vehicles
is similar in approach to a regulatory sandbox model. Current safety data
reporting requirements, however, are not sufficient to allow agencies to build
expertise that will enable future regulation that keeps meaningful pace with
new AV technology. Adherence to each of the elements of a sandbox model
—data collection, regulatory adaptation and industry collaboration
procedures, technology neutral regulatory exemptions that enable real-world
testing, and strict limitations in scope and duration—would help to balance
the need to support innovation with the need for public safety and the
development of regulatory expertise in this area.

